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A Crisis of Parliament 
David Judge 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The words ÔparliamentÕ and ÔcrisisÕ have often been linked in single sentences, in 
different time periods, in different countries and in the pronouncements of politicians 
and academics alike. The impression is often given that crisis is endemic to 
parliaments and parliamentary systems for, as Bracher (1967: 245) noted nearly 50 
years ago, ÔThe phrase Òcrisis of parliamentarismÓ is nearly as old as the 
phenomenon of parliamentary democracyÕ. Indeed, a random selection of analyses 
of parliaments over this period produces references to Ômodern crises of parliamentsÕ 
(Loewenberg 1971: 4) or Ôa crisis of representative democracy?Õ (Alonso et al. 2011: 
7). What these random quotations point to, respectively, is that parliaments and 
parliamentarianism may be confronted with possible multiple crises, and, when a 
question mark is appended, the notion of Ôparliamentary crisisÕ becomes a 
contestable proposition and is not simply a matter of fact. What they also point to is 
that the institution of parliament needs to be located within the broader analytical 
frames of parliamentarism and parliamentary democracy. 
The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the contestability of the idea of 
parliamentary crisis in the UK and to do so by making a basic distinction between 
parliament as an institution, parliamentarianism as a system of government and 
parliamentary democracy as a form of representative democracy. Although 
inextricably interlinked in practice, these terms are capable of being disaggregated 
analytically, in which case, ÔcrisisÕ may manifest itself differently, disproportionally, or 
not at all, across different analytical layers. ÔCrisisÕ, for the purposes of this chapter, 
is taken as a social construction of what constitutes Ôa conjunction of undesirable 
circumstances beyond the normÕ (Drennan and McConnell 2007: 16; see also 
Nohrstedt and Weible 2010: 5). In this sense what constitutes an exceptional threat, 
the level of intensity of the threat to the status quo and the urgency required in 
responding to such threats are open to interpretation and contestation. 
Threaded through the analysis of this chapter are the concepts of legitimacy and 
legitimation. Just as these concepts are central to any understanding of the 
institutional purpose and standing of parliament, equally they are crucial to a 
conceptualisation of crisis. Indeed, as Boin (2004: 167) notes, Ôthe currency of crisis 
is legitimacyÕ (see also ÕtHart and Boin 2001: 31; Stark 2010: 4). Thus a crisis 
manifests itself when a marked decline in legitimacy incapacitates an institution: 
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At the heart of crisis is an unremitting discrepancy between external 
expectations and perceived performance … If we take shifts in legitimacy as 
a key indicator of disruption it can be argued that any kind of rapid decline in 
the legitimacy of institutional structures that were previously widely valued 
helps us to identify a … crisis. (Boin 2004: 168) 
The argument is advanced that if there is a crisis, or a series of interconnected 
crises, then it might well be that what the UK is witnessing is a conceptual crisis: a 
crisis that stems from the counter-positioning of established notions of representative 
democracy and legitimacy derived from electoral processes against countervailing 
conceptions of democratic representation and representative claims which are not 
focused upon, or do not privilege, the institutional form of parliament or electoral 
representation. In one sense, this argument simply reformulates historic questions 
about the nature of representative democracy and notions of democratic legitimacy. 
In answering these questions the distinctive nature of the Ôlegitimation claimsÕ of 
parliament (or more precisely the elected element of the House of Commons) is 
addressed and located within a discussion of diffuse systemic political support. 
The discussion is structured in the following manner. It starts by examining empirical 
evidence of Ôa crisis of public confidence and popular trustÕ in the institution of 
parliament, before considering levels of diffuse support for the wider system of 
parliamentary democracy in the UK. Concerns that the Westminster parliament has 
been residualised in the system of UK governance are then examined within a 
broader discussion of the Westminster model and its continuing significance as a 
legitimating frame for UK government. The crisis dimensions of this frame, which are 
encapsulated in a closed logical loop interred in the disjunction between the 
idealised prescriptions of the Westminster model and the practice of governance in 
the UK, are then analysed. The final section of the chapter moves the focus of the 
discussion away from a perceived Ôcrisis of governmentÕ to a Ôcrisis of parliamentary 
representationÕ. This latter ÔcrisisÕ has manifested itself both in theory, in a 
Ôreconceptualisation of representationÕ that asserts the legitimacy and authenticity of 
non-electoral representative claims, and, in practice, in the implementation of 
Ôdemocratic innovationsÕ and the increased importance of non-electoral modes of 
representation beyond the conventional institutional configurations of elections and 
parliamentary institutions. 
Parliament as an institution: Indicators of crisis Ð trust/confidence 
Specific indicators 
When popular trust in the UK parliament has been probed, levels of public 
support/trust have been found to be worryingly low (for a broader analysis of trust in 
UK institutions, see Chapter 2). Indeed, low trust is combined with low public 
knowledge thresholds about the workings of parliament. Thus, for example, when 
respondents to the Hansard Society surveys have been asked how much they know 
specifically about the UK parliament, 61 per cent on average claimed to know 
nothing or not very much about parliament (across the six surveys in which this 
question was asked), with 15 per cent claiming to know nothing at all about the UK 
parliament (Hansard Society 2013: 32). 
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When members of the public have been asked specifically about their ÔtrustÕ in 
parliament the results, in successive Eurobarometer surveys, have consistently 
recorded a marked propensity Ôto tend not to trustÕ the UK parliament rather than Ôto 
tend to trustÕ. In 2012, 25 per cent tended to trust in contrast to 70 per cent who 
tended not to trust (average across Eurobarometer 2012a , 2012b). This marked a 
nearly 50 per cent decline in those trusting parliament within the space of a decade 
(down from 47 per cent in 2001) and a nearly 40 per cent increase in those tending 
not to trust parliament (up from 43 per cent) in the same period (Eurobarometer 
2001). Interestingly, for all that the furore over MPsÕ expenses in 2009 was deemed 
to constitute a ÔcrisisÕ, especially in the media, public reaction Ôdid not manifest itself, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, in collapsing levels of trust in politics and 
politiciansÕ (Hansard Society 2009: 126, Fox 2010: 6). In this respect, although the 
scandal surrounding MPsÕ expenses served as a Ôfocusing eventÕ in subjecting the 
activities of MPs to unremitting public scrutiny and no little ridicule, it did not mark a 
catastrophic drop in trust levels. In part, the failure to stimulate such a ÔcollapseÕ was 
because of the perilously low pre-existing levels of trust. It should be noted, however, 
that there was an 11 per cent drop in trust in parliament, as an institution, at the 
height of the expenses scandal between Eurobarometer 70 (OctoberÐNovember 
2008) and Eurobarometer 71 (JuneÐJuly 2009); and that the level of trust in 
parliament has not yet recovered to the institutional trust levels immediately prior to 
the scandal (30 percent in Eurobarometer 70, and 34 per cent in Eurobarometer 68 
between October and November 2007). These low institutional trust scores also 
reflect ÔconfidenceÕ assessments of the UK parliament, with, for example, only 23 per 
cent of respondents to the European Values Survey of 2008 recording a great deal 
or quite a lot of confidence in the Westminster parliament. 
A caveat should, however, be entered at this stage by noting that it is unclear from 
these surveys exactly what respondents were assessing in making their confidence 
judgement, or what was their cognitive basis for scoring levels of trust (Marien and 
Hooghe 2011: 3; Hooghe 2011: 270). Nonetheless, despite this caveat, and no 
matter what was being measured, levels of trust and confidence in the UK parliament 
are distinctly lower in the UK than in all but four of the relatively well-established 
parliamentary democracies in the EU (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, excluding 
post-2004 accession states). Moreover, although there were trendless fluctuations in 
most of these EU states across time, the UK (along with Portugal) stands out for Ôa 
significant growth of cynicismÕ towards parliament since the 1990s (Norris 2011: 73). 
For many, these findings are sufficient evidence of a Ôcrisis of public confidenceÕ in 
the UK parliament. 
General indicators 
Yet, surveys in the UK also reveal that citizens are capable of making discriminatory 
trust-judgements amongst and between politicians and political institutions (even if 
survey questions use single item indicators). Moreover, the more astute analysts of 
political behaviour acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of trust. Thus, for example, 
Pippa Norris Ð in her analysis of trends in citizensÕ attitudes towards democratic 
governance Ð makes a distinction between specific trust (at the level of political 
actors or public policies) (2011: 61) and diffuse trust (as a form of Ôinstitutional 
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confidenceÕ which reflects more enduring and general orientations than trust in 
particular actors or policy programmes (2011: 66)).  
Even at the level of institutional confidence, different trust judgements may 
conceivably apply from one institution to another and, indeed, are empirically 
observable (Norris 2011: 70Ð82). In this sense, Norris locates a conception of 
political trust in close proximity to EastonÕs broader conception of political support: 
with its specific and diffuse dimensions (Easton 1965; and see below). 
This point can be illustrated in relation to the UK parliament. There remains relatively 
limited confidence in parliamentÕs specific capacities with, for example, only 47 per 
cent of respondents in the 2013 Audit of Political Engagement agreeing that 
parliament held government to account (Hansard Society 2013: 57). Yet, when 
asked whether the UK parliament was essential to UK democracy, over two-thirds 
(68 per cent) of respondents agreed, with 30 per cent strongly agreeing. Only seven 
per cent disagreed. In fact the 2013 result marked an eight per cent increase on the 
2010 result of 60 per cent who found parliament ÔworthwhileÕ or ÔessentialÕ (Hansard 
Society 2010: 41). This might be taken as an indication of a relatively high level of 
general or diffuse support or trust for the institution when located within the wider 
system of representative democracy. Indeed, generalised support for such a system 
continues at relatively high levels. Evidence of this is provided in a YouGov poll in 
2012 which repeated a question asked in a 1969 Gallop Poll, ÔWould you describe 
Britain as a democratic country or not?Õ (Kellner 2012: 2). The respective positive 
answers were 68 per cent in 1969 and 67 per cent in 2012. The negative answers 
revealed a small decrease across the two surveys from 20 per cent to 17 per cent. 
When pushed still further about their assessment of British democracy, 63 per cent 
of respondents to the 2012 YouGov poll were prepared to support the statement ÔFor 
all its faults, BritainÕs democratic system is one of the finest in the world.Õ 
The significance of these empirical findings for the following discussion is two-fold. 
First, there is a distinction to be drawn between attitudes to parliament as an 
institution and parliament as part of a system of representative democracy. Second, 
specific public concerns about institutional competence (controlling government) 
linked to specific trust and specific aspects of MPsÕ roles, sit alongside general 
recognition of the ÔessentialÕ categorical role of the UK parliament in defining Ôour 
democracyÕ. David EastonÕs notion of Ôdiffuse supportÕ is of resonance here. Diffuse 
support for Easton encompasses Ôrudimentary convictions about the appropriateness 
of the political order of thingsÕ (1965: 279) and generalized beliefs, no matter how 
inarticulate, Ôthat the authorities and the order within which they operate is right and 
properÕ (1965: 280). The significance of these generalised beliefs will be discussed 
below, but first specific aspects of parliamentÕs institutional roles and capacities need 
to be examined. 
Parliamentarism as a system of government 
Specific crises 
Loewenberg (1971: 4), as noted above, identified Ômodern crisesÕ (in the plural) of 
parliaments. These crises emerged as the expectations associated with pre-
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democratic parliaments Ð of the representation of a narrowly defined Ôpolitical nationÕ 
of vested socio-economic interests, collective institutional behaviour and an 
egalitarian organisational structure Ð came increasingly to be at odds with the 
institutional characteristics of parliaments in an age of the mass franchise. The first 
crisis emerged from the role of political parties in the wake of the development of the 
mass franchise. Parties sought to Ômobilize the new electorate, to recruit 
representatives from it, and control these representatives after their electionÕ (1971: 
5). The second was the expansion of the demands made upon parliaments as the 
scope of government increased almost exponentially, as public policies became 
increasingly complex, and as specialized oversight and interventions by parliament 
became more imperative. The third was the enhanced position of executive 
leadership in the political system and its corollary of the Ôexecutive dominationÕ of 
parliaments (1971: 12). 
It is the third ÔcrisisÕ that has attracted most attention in the UK, but the other two are 
inextricably linked and continue to sustain elemental percussive backbeats to the 
ÔcrisisÕ in executive-legislative relations. The third dimension of the crisis was 
presented in a particularly stark form in the Power Commission Report in its 
conclusion that the UK was confronted by a Ôcrisis of a nineteenth-century political 
system facing twenty-first-century citizensÕ (Power Commission 2006: 108). At the 
centre of this crisis was the purported fact that Ô[t]he Executive in Britain is now more 
powerful in relation to Parliament than it has been probably since the time of 
WalpoleÕ (Power Commission 2006: 128). While the Power Commission Report 
distilled the essence of broader, longstanding public and parliamentarian fears of an 
over-dominant executive, it attracted criticism from Flinders and Kelso (2011: 257) 
who sought to argue that such fears were overblown (for a critique of this position 
see Chapter 1). According to them, the Power Commission Report, along with most 
of the Political Science profession in the UK, failed Ôto take account of the 
complexities of parliamentÕ (2011: 257) and the Ôcomplex resource 
interdependencies that actually existÕ (2011: 259) between the executive and 
legislature. They also claimed that Ôscholars may have contributed to an erosion of 
public support in politics in general and declining levels of public confidence in 
parliaments in particularÕ (2011: 250). The general thrust of their argument is that 
public cynicism about parliament and MPs (which is often taken as an indicator of an 
attitudinal crisis) may have increased in an Ôover-inflationÕ of public expectations 
(fuelled by inaccurate conceptualisations of parliamentÕs position in the UK state) 
alongside a deflation of the results of Ôdetailed empirical researchÕ (which provide 
practical contestations of those erroneous conceptualisations). 
Even if, as Flinders and Kelso suggest, the imbalance between executive and 
parliament is not quite as lopsided as often portrayed in caricatured accounts of UK 
governance, there is still widespread concern that parliament has been residualised 
in the system of government. Although, as the next section reveals, simple 
arguments that the Westminster model no longer accurately describes the reality of 
contemporary UK governance have been moderated, and replaced with arguments 
that the Westminster model remains of importance as a validation of the activities of 
a centralised executive, the position of parliament in these arguments remains 
tenuous. Parliament as an institution may not be in ÔcrisisÕ, but when located within 
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broader conceptualisations of governance and the British political tradition (BPT) 
(see Introduction), it may be at the epicentre of a crisis of parliamentarism. 
The Westminster model 
For a model that has attracted sustained criticism from political scientists for most of 
the past three decades or so, and one that provides the counterpoint for a self-
proclaimed new Ôconventional wisdomÕ of policy communities (Jordan 1990: 471) or a 
Ônew orthodoxyÕ of a differentiated polity (Marsh 2010), the Westminster model has 
proved remarkably resilient. 
In part this resilience stems from the simple fact that there is no agreed definition of 
the Westminster model, and no real agreement whether it is an Ôorganising 
perspectiveÕ (Gamble 1990: 404Ð6), part of a Ôpolitical traditionÕ (most recently Hall 
2012: 92Ð120) or a descriptive model. Similarly, the fact that some 14 key beliefs 
and core institutions can be, and have been, identified as constituent elements of the 
Westminster model at various times (Rhodes et al. 2009: 7) makes it relatively easy 
to identify some continuities of Ôkey beliefsÕ or institutional configurations over time. 
Conversely of course it also makes it relatively easy to identify discontinuities or 
disjunctions of some other elements over time, as indeed critics of the model have 
demonstrated persistently. 
It is instructive that the most recent, and most detailed, examination of the 
Westminster model identified at its core a set of four interrelated components which 
not only echoed those identified earlier by Gamble (1990: 407) but which, more 
significantly, reflected the central ideas of the Westminster model Ôas understood by 
its constitutive actorsÕ (Rhodes et al. 2009: 10). The four components were: 
responsible government with political executives drawn from parliament and 
ultimately dependent upon sustaining the legislatureÕs confidence; an executive 
whose members are individually and collectively accountable to parliament; a 
professional, non-partisan and ÔpermanentÕ public service; and, in the UK at least, a 
legally sovereign parliament (Rhodes et al. 2009: 10). They are deemed to be core 
ideas in that they have the deepest historical roots and Ôtypically gravitateÕ (Rhodes 
et al. 2009: 9) around the constitutional fusion of the executive and legislature (see 
also Richards and Smith 2002, Richards 2008: 15Ð16). 
Over time other ideas have been Ôgrafted onÕ to this core: some for 
categorical/taxonomic reasons, in the sense of being used to categorise and 
differentiate majoritarian from consensual systems (Lijphart 1999: 1Ð8), and some 
for descriptive accuracy in the sense of reflecting changed practices in relation to 
electoral processes, party systems and inter-institutional interactions. Yet the 
emphasis upon inserting more elements into the model to bolster its descriptive 
accuracy skewed the debate towards empirical positivist analysis and towards 
measuring the degree of separation between model and political practice. In this 
respect critics started from the premise that the Westminster model constituted an 
accurate representation of political reality. Not surprisingly they discovered that it 
was not. What the Westminster model sketched, in the pivotal period of its inception 
in the second half of the 19th century, was an idealised Ôliberal view of the 
constitutionÕ that constituted Ôa theory of legitimate powerÕ (Birch 1964: 65). As such, 
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from the outset, it was an artificial contrivance that arose out of the conflation of 
liberal theories of representation with a Diceyean view of liberal government (Judge 
1993: 138Ð40). The brief and exceptional convergence between the prescriptions of 
the liberal view of the constitution and the practice of liberal government in the mid-
19th century became petrified in seminal academic writings, most notably those of 
Dicey, despite the manifest erosion of the precepts of the liberal view after 1867. 
Indeed, for much of the period thereafter Ôadherents to the Liberal theory of the state 
[encapsulated in the Westminster model] have been regretfully aware that political 
practice has departed from [these] principlesÕ (Birch 1964: 80). 
Just such awareness has, since the late-1970s, been an analytical stem cell in the 
genetic development, mutation and transmutation of models of policy communities, 
networks, governance, multi-level governance, differentiated polity and asymmetric 
power (e.g. Richardson and Jordan 1979, Rhodes and Marsh 1992, Rhodes 1997, 
Bache and Flinders 2004, Bevir and Rhodes 2003, Marsh et al. 2003, Richards 
2008): all of which started from the premise that they provided ÔalternativesÕ or posed 
a Ôdirect challengeÕ to the Westminster model (Marsh 2012: 46Ð8). The ÔchallengeÕ 
was empirical insofar as these alternatives sketched a more realistic representation 
of the UK polity (e.g. Bevir and Rhodes 2003: 198Ð9). 
Initially such ÔcorrectiveÕ accounts were dismissive of parliamentÕs contribution to 
governance narratives, with parliament variously being seen to be insulated from 
networks, or residualised in the policy process, or in fact superseded in a Ôpost-
parliamentaryÕ polity (e.g. Jordan and Richardson 1987: 288, Richardson 1993: 90, 
2000: 1006, Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 13, Rhodes 1997: 38). Notably, for the 
present discussion, the residualisation of parliament in these alternative models was 
not treated as Ôa crisisÕ but something lower down the Richter scale of normative 
anxiety. There was certainly acknowledgement that, if these alternative models 
better encapsulated the processes of UK governance, then there were Ônormative 
grounds for concernÕ (Grant 2000: 51). Similarly, Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 265), in 
recognising that normative questions about the extent to which networks undermined 
existing notions of parliamentary democracy remained largely unexplored in their 
model, nonetheless raised a concern, bordering on pessimism, at the extent to which 
the Ôoutput legitimacyÕ claimed by networks served to insulate their activities from the 
Ôconstraint of political, especially electoral, legitimacyÕ. 
In part, such relative normative sanguineness might have been because new modes 
of governance were not as insulated from electoral representative processes as 
network analysts made out (Judge 1993: 120Ð30, 2005: 106Ð14). More importantly, 
however, was a claim that networks were nested in a process of parliamentary 
representation and the legitimation of government and government outputs flowing 
from that process. Indeed, the legitimating frame provided by the Westminster model 
is now widely recognised even by those intent on demonstrating that political 
practice does not correspond to the political prescriptions of the Westminster model. 
Such recognition is to be found in Rhodes et al.Õs (2009: 29) statement: 
In Westminster systems traditions provide a set of maps, a language, and 
historical narratives about government that over time captures those 
essential features we would now group under the heading Ôthe Westminster 
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modelÕ … We disagree that Westminster is a fantasy … it is better seen as a 
set of evolving traditions couched in myth. 
More precisely Rhodes et al. identify the Westminster model as a Ôlegitimizing 
interpretationÕ which allows Ôvarious actorsÕ to provide legitimacy and context for their 
actions (2009: 228). Similarly, other contemporary analyses of UK governance are 
replete with reference to the Westminster model as a Ôlegitimising mythologyÕ 
(Richards 2008: 199, Diamond and Richards 2012: 192, Hall 2012: 12); a 
Ôlegitimating toolÕ or a Ôlegitimating frameworkÕ (Flinders 2010: 25). 
This framework is strikingly evident too in official descriptions of UK governance. 
Official views Ð recently enunciated in the Cabinet Manual (Cabinet Office 2011: 2Ð
4) Ð still proclaim the four key elements of the Westminster model. These are not 
false statements, as the term ÔmythÕ might suggest (Keating 2008: 111) but reflect 
instead the ideas of legitimate government as refracted in the vision of the executive. 
What is important about these official statements is that they combine statements 
about Ôwhat isÕ with Ôwhat should beÕ; and these ideas extend beyond formal official 
pronouncements. Of particular relevance, Richards (2008: 199) noted, from his 
interviews with ministers and civil servants, that Ôit is important to appreciate the 
extent to which actors from the core executive have continued to draw from the 
Westminster model in defining, shaping and legitimising their behaviourÕ. Diamond 
and Richards (2012: 182) also reaffirmed the Ôcontinuing salience of narratives that 
have emerged from within that [Westminster] model which still condition the mindset 
of ministers and civil servantsÕ (see also Richards and Mathers 2010: 516Ð18, Bevir 
2010: 125). In case it is suspected that the salience of the Westminster model for 
members of the executive pertains mainly to the centralisation/hierarchical 
dimensions of the model, it is worthy of note that the responsibility/accountability 
dimensions continue to feature predominantly in the mindset of ministers and civil 
servants (e.g. Stark 2011: 1151, Rhodes 2011: 38, 229). 
In parallel to this internal executive recognition of the continuing significance of 
parliament, academics, many of whom started as parliamentary sceptics, were 
willing to concede Ð even if grudgingly Ð the importance of parliament to legitimation 
processes in the UK (Richardson 1993: 90, Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998: 62Ð3, Marsh 
et al. 2001: 244Ð7,  2003: 314). Yet, even if there is now a broader 
acknowledgement that the four key notions of the Westminster model serve as a 
framework of ideas through which the members of the core executive in the UK seek 
to legitimise their institutional position and their policy preferences, there is equally a 
consensus that the UK polity does not necessarily adhere closely to those ideas in 
practice. Smith (2008: 150) makes this point neatly in his observation that Ôas a myth 
the Westminster model may represent how officials and ministers present the 
political system, but however strong their beliefs … it does not represent the truth 
about either the power of ministers or of officials [or how the system works]Õ. 
Obviously SmithÕs statement throws up questions about ÔtruthÕ and about ÔmythÕ. This 
is not the place to engage in the deconstruction of the term ÔmythÕ. What is important 
instead is to disinter from this brief consideration of the Westminster model, the crisis 
dimensions that stem from the analysis. These can be specified within a closed 
logical loop. First, there is a disjunction between the idealised prescriptions of the 
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Westminster model and the practice of governance in the UK. Second, all 
contemporary governments describe, and so define, UK state institutional 
interactions in terms of the Ôrepresentative and responsibleÕ core of the Westminster 
model. Third, this definition still Ôconditions the mindset of ministers and civil 
servantsÕ. Fourth, the Westminster model cements into the political institutional 
architecture of the UK the pivotal importance of parliament in providing the 
legitimating frame for executive action: for, as Judge (2006: 369) noted, in the UK an 
Ôexecutive-centric state has been justified in terms of a legislative-centric theory of 
parliamentary sovereigntyÕ. Fifth, in spite of points two to four, point one still pertains. 
In this loop an inherent conceptual ÔcrisisÕ is embedded. Executives depend upon a 
model of legitimation, the practical deficiencies of which possess the capacity to 
undermine the very claims to legitimacy incorporated within the model. Yet 
executives are unable to prescribe or incapable of articulating Ð either theoretically or 
expediently Ð an alternative model without dissipating the Ôlegislative-centric theory 
of parliamentary sovereigntyÕ. This is why the executive remains insistent that 
ÔParliament is sovereign [even if] … in practice … Parliament has chosen to be 
constrained in various waysÕ (Cabinet Office 2011: 3 para 9). This very insistence 
fuels disbelief and dissatisfaction. In this manner the executive is locked into a 
Ôconceptual crisisÕ. This is why the Blair and Brown Labour governments Ð in their 
repeated declarations that Ôthere is no intention to begin from first principlesÕ (HL 
Debates 21 June 2001: col 52) Ð consistently defended their actions and formulated 
institutional change within the parameters of the Westminster model (Judge 2005: 
273Ð9, 2006; Richards 2008: 196Ð203; Flinders 2010: 279Ð86). Equally this is why 
critics of those governments lamented, and continue to lament, a failure to provide a 
Ônew narrativeÕ (Hazell 2007: 18Ð19), an Ôexplicitly defined governing theoryÕ 
(Diamond 2011: 68) distinct from the Westminster model, a Ôdiscernable conception 
of an alternative constitutionÕ (Flinders 2010: 285) or an Ôoverarching theory of 
governmentÕ (Diamond and Richards 2012: 191), 
Parliament, electoral representation and non-electoral representative claims 
In the unmediated principal-agent view of responsibility in the Westminster model, 
power flows serially from electors to parliament, and from parliament to the 
executive. So far in this chapter attention has been focused primarily on the 
parliament-executive nexus and the challenges posed by decentred network 
governance to the Westminster model. What has attracted far less attention, but 
what is ultimately at the heart of network governance analysis, is ÔrepresentationÕ. 
Simply stated: networks incorporate non-elected representatives into decision-
making processes. This redirects our attention 180 degrees away from the executive 
to the representative linkage between Ôthe peopleÕ and state decision-makers. If the 
UK is not facing a Ôcrisis of governmentÕ, it might yet be facing a Ôcrisis of 
representationÕ (Saward 2008: 93). 
The problem with formulating such an argument, however, is, as Mainwaring et al. 
(2006: 15) note, Ôthe notion of a crisis of democratic representation is 
underspecifiedÕ. A meaning of crisis is to be found at the end of a continuum of 
democratic representation Ôat which citizens do not believe they are well representedÕ 
(Mainwaring et al. 2006: 15). Mainwaring et al. maintained that a crisis of democratic 
representation had two basic components: attitudinal/subjective and behavioural. 
 
10 
The attitudinal component manifested itself in the perceptions of citizens when Ôlarge 
numbers of citizens are dissatisfied with the way in which they are represented, or 
they feel not represented at allÕ (Mainwaring et al. 2006: 15). In many respects these 
perceptions are independent of whether representatives do or do not act on behalf of 
constituents or in the Ôpublic interestÕ; what matters is whether electors perceive that 
their representatives are acting on their behalf (as individual constituents or as part 
of a collectivity of the Ôpolitical nationÕ). Importantly, Mainwaring et al. proceed to 
argue that even if there is widespread citizen dissatisfaction with elected 
representatives there has also to be a behavioural response to that disaffection. This 
would take the form of ÔrepudiationÕ: of citizens rejecting existing electoral 
representative processes (Mainwaring et al. 2006: 15). In analysing five countries in 
the Andean region of Latin America, Mainwaring et al. were well aware that their 
choice of cases placed their comparator countries at the ÔunambiguousÕ end of a 
continuum of crisis. Moreover, they were aware of the difficulty of conceiving of crisis 
as a continuum: insofar as there is Ôno precise cut point that enables one to 
categorize case A as a crisis and case B as a non-crisisÕ (2006: 16). In which case, 
Mainwaring et al. conceded that the concept Ôcrisis of democratic representationÕ is 
Ônot useful for intermediate casesÕ (2006: 16). The UK would fall within this 
intermediate category. 
In this intermediate position there is clear attitudinal evidence in the UK of specific 
public disquiet with the formal representative processes (in seeming contradiction of 
the buoyant diffuse support noted earlier). A YouGov Poll in 2012 found, for 
instance, that only 15 per cent of respondents agreed that the Westminster 
parliament Ôdoes a good job in representing the interests and wishes of people like 
youÕ (Kellner 2012: 2). This response was relatively consistent across the regions 
and nations of the UK. Moreover, 66 per cent of respondents believed that Ômost 
MPs end up becoming remote from the everyday lives and concerns of the people 
they representÕ. When asked which groups of people ÔMPs generally pay most 
attention toÕ, Ôthe peopleÕ (conceived as Ôvoters who live in their own constituencyÕ or 
Ôpeople like youÕ) played a relatively insignificant role. Only 27 per cent believed that 
MPs paid most attention to constituency voters, and an even starker finding was that 
only 5 per cent believed MPs paid most attention to Ôpeople like youÕ. When asked to 
choose one specific focus to which ÔMPs nowadays pay most attentionÕ, only one in 
25 respondents (4 per cent) identified that focus as the Ômajority view among voters 
in their constituencyÕ (Kellner 2012: 14). The significance of these findings, when 
refracted through Mainwaring et al.Õs lens of the attitudinal/subjective component of 
representational crisis, is that Ôthe point [of such findings] is not whether the bad 
reputation of MPs and Parliament is deserved or undeserved. It is what people thinkÕ 
(Kellner 2012: 8). 
When combined with behavioural changes by mass publics towards the institutions 
of representative democracy Ð evident in decreased levels of turnout at 
parliamentary elections, steeply declining memberships of UK nationally focused 
political parties, low knowledge thresholds of the purpose, functions and activities of 
parliament and parliamentarians, in fact in most of the indicators of Ôwhy people hate 
politicsÕ (Hay 2007, Stoker 2006) Ð it is possible to move the UK further towards the 
crisis end of Mainwaring et al.Õs continuum. 
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Yet, in order to prevent further drift of representative democracy in the UK towards 
the negative end of this crisis continuum, successive attempts have been made to 
redress some of the perceived imbalances of parliamentary representation (for a 
critique of these attempts see Chapters 2 and 5). These have included strategies to: 
enhance the ÔrepresentativenessÕ of parliament through programmes (primarily 
implemented through political parties) to improve the Ôdescriptive representationÕ of 
the Commons in terms of gender, ethnicity and sexual characteristics; transmit the 
views of constituents more directly to their elected representatives through e-
petitions and advisory referendums; increase control over representatives through 
proposals for the recall of MPs; and to engage electors more actively in 
understanding parliament through improved parliamentary outreach services. Yet, as 
the YouGov poll evidence suggests, these proactive programmes appear to have 
had little impact on the attitudinal dimensions of crisis. 
At the same time, examination of the behavioural dimensions point to an increased 
privileging of non-electoral modes of representation over electoral forms of 
representation. At a practical level, UK governments have deployed some Ôstate 
sponsoredÕ non-electoral modes of representation Ð citizensÕ juries, focus groups, 
citizensÕ assemblies, deliberative forums, consultative forums Ð to ÔsupplementÕ 
formal electoral representation. The case is made that the addition of non-electoral 
representation alongside electoral representation is Ôpositive-sumÕ (Saward 2009: 
21). Such non-electoral initiatives are deemed Ôtypically [to] function not as 
alternatives but rather as supplements to elected representative bodiesÕ (Urbinati 
and Warren 2008: 405). Certainly, Labour governments before 2010 saw the use of 
deliberative mechanisms as an enhancement of representative processes 
(McLaverty 2009: 384). Yet the compatibility of electoral and non-electoral 
representative forms might be as much a construct of wishful thinking as empirical 
observation. As Beetham (2011: 125) notes, many of these state-sponsored non-
electoral modes of representation result in parliament being bypassed as a 
representative channel. Indeed, it is worth quoting Beetham at some length: 
What is noticeable about most of these [non-electoral] initiatives, and the 
discussion of them in the academic literature, is that they completelyignore 
or bypass parliaments. While at first glance they might seem to be 
complementary to the formal representative process, there is a danger that 
they only serve to diminish its significance and public legitimacy … 
Proposals for re-engaging citizens in politics through new forms of 
participation are likely to further this erosion if ways cannot be found to 
incorporate them into the established representative process. (Beetham 
2011: 134, 138) 
As noted in Chapter 2, in many other instances, however, non-electoral claims are 
voiced, often out of necessity, beyond the formal representative processes: literally 
on the streets outside of representative institutions. In recent times, streets around 
Westminster have reverberated to claims of Ônot in our nameÕ (Iraq war 
demonstrations), Ôwe are the 99 per centÕ (Occupy LSX demonstrations), Ôall together 
for public servicesÕ (TUC anti-cuts rally), or to a host of more delimited claims by 
students to Ôfund our futureÕ or of public sector workers to Ôsave our pensionsÕ. In 
essence, these are Ôrepresentative claimsÕ by non-elected political actors. Similarly, 
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the Ôperformance protestsÕ coordinated by, for example, UK Uncut in campaigns 
against, variously, corporate tax avoidance and NHS cuts, or by Plane Stupid 
against the expansion of Heathrow airport, constituted clear, non-electoral, 
representative claims. In making these representative claims such groups often 
sought to address non-parliamentary audiences and to construct non-electoral 
constituencies (see also Chapter 5). 
Non-electoral representation and the distinctiveness of electoral representation 
Saward has been at the forefront in the UK of the reconceptualisation of 
representation. In particular he has been determined to show that Ôlegislatures, 
formal territorial constituencies and the institutions they support are not all that 
matters to political representationÕ (Saward 2010: 31). More importantly, for the 
present discussion, he also maintains that any prior assumption Ð that elected 
representatives are the sole or Ôfully legitimate representativesÕ (Saward 2010: 167, 
emphasis in original) Ð needs to be questioned; as does the notion that Ôthe 
unelected are automatically illegitimate representativesÕ (Saward 2010: 167). It is the 
claiming rather than the possession of the attribute of legitimate authority that is 
important: ÔWhat needs to be generated is a sense of legitimacyÕ (Saward 2011: 77). 
This allows Saward to conceive of democratic representation as a diffuse set of 
political practices and performances whereby democratic representation can 
plausibly be seen in Ômany manifestations of non-statal political representationÕ 
rather than being identified with a specific set of institutions (Saward 2011: 93). In 
this reformulation the essence of democratic legitimacy Ôis understood as Òperceived 
legitimacyÓ as reflected in the acceptance of claims over time by appropriate 
constituencies under certain conditionsÕ (Saward 2010: 84). Thus, recognition of 
legitimate representative claims beyond the institutional configurations of elections 
and representative assemblies is a key part of reconconceptualisations of 
representation (Urbinati and Warren 2008: 391). As such they hold the potential to 
deprivilege parliamentary representation, to question the legitimacy of electoral 
representation and so to contribute to a perception of parliamentary crisis. 
But, even Saward (2010: 167) acknowledges that his approach does not constitute a 
Ôblack-and-white alternativeÕ to conventional conceptions of electoral democracy and 
that ÔElections and parliaments and the forms of due authorization and accountability 
they offer still matter, of course.Õ In fact he observes that those representative claims 
that are held to be compelling, or which have particular resonance among relevant 
audiences, Ôwill be made from Òready madesÓ, existing terms and understanding that 
the would-be audiences at a given time will recognizeÕ (Saward 2010: 84). This is of 
significance in differentiating electoral from non-electoral claims as one of the Ôready 
madesÕ of Ômodern democratic constitutional designÕ is the Ôcentre-stagingÕ of 
electoral representation, which is Ôoften now taken to be the paradigm of democracyÕ. 
Indeed, for present purposes, it is worth reiterating that elections underpin the 
Ôperceived legitimacyÕ of electoral representation, and provide recurring opportunities 
where the represented assent to being represented Ð whether assent is based upon 
prospective or retrospective judgements of representativesÕ performance, or both 
(Rehfeld 2006: 188). In other words, electoral representation is identified as Ôthe 
received (and adaptable) frame within which we understand and interpret politicsÕ 
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(Saward 2010: 178), and Ôit matters hugely for us to acknowledge and understand 
claims we accept more or less unthinkinglyÕ (Saward 2010: 60). 
At this stage in the discussion it is worth noting the parallels with David EastonÕs 
notion of Ôdiffuse supportÕ noted earlier. Such support is dependent upon evaluations 
of the pertaining political Ôrules of the gameÕ; the continuing validation of which is 
underpinned by a Ôlegitimating ideologyÕ. In the general case of liberal democracies 
this ideology Ð as the Ôethical principles that justify the way power is organized, used 
and limitedÕ (Easton 1965: 292) Ð is enunciated in the language of electoral 
representation. In the specific case of the UK, Ôthe general belief, whether based on 
reason or not … that public policy should be sanctioned and authorized by a 
representative body still pervades the … polityÕ (Judge 1999: 141, emphasis added). 
Such diffuse support is often tacit, even covert (Easton 1965: 161), unthinking, but, 
nonetheless, profound in the sense that, as noted above, it gives the elected 
representative Ôa head start in terms of familiarity and perceived legitimacyÕ. 
What also gives parliament a head start is that at Ôa strongly abstract level, 
representation in its most familiar contemporary guises, is ÒOne to AllÓ … This 
oneness is positive. It provides an answer to the basic political question Ð who 
resolves issues when they are contested?Õ (Saward 2010: 90Ð1). In the case of 
liberal democracies it is a stateÕs legislature that Ôbrings the nation together 
symbolically under one roofÕ (Saward 2010: 90). Indeed, opinion poll data suggests 
that there remains overwhelming public support for such a national focus in the UK 
(Committee on Standards in Public Life 2011: 30). On average, 93 per cent of 
respondents in the period 2004Ð10 believed that MPsÕ decisions should be guided by 
Ôwhat would benefit people living in the country as a wholeÕ. This national focus 
outstripped both a party focus (84 per cent support) and a constituency focus (84 per 
cent support) in the same period. 
The symbolism and reality of contemporary parliamentary deliberation in the UK may 
be severely mismatched, but the symbolism has a practical significance in that it 
enables elected representatives, and especially governments derived from national 
representative assemblies, to claim to speak for the collective entity of Ôthe nationÕ. 
While non-elected representatives may wish to claim that they too speak for a Ôhigher 
levelÕ national interest (or even Ôhigher levelsÕ beyond the state), what differentiates 
their claim from that of the elected representative is the manner in which the visions 
of the collective interest is constructed. Sidestepping here the protracted debate 
about the terminological differences between Ôthe national interestÕ, Ôthe public willÕ, 
and Ôthe general willÕ, and how each is conceptualised and deployed in political 
theory, the important point for present purposes is that a national representative 
assembly is required to justify, through deliberation, the vision of the national interest 
propounded therein (Judge 2013; see also Chapter 7). In this respect, justification is 
a form of accountability or responsibility. What distinguishes electoral forms of 
representation, ultimately, is that Ôonly the elected have both deliberative and 
decision making powerÕ (Urbinati 2006: 15). 
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Conclusion: a conceptual crisis? 
So where does the preceding discussion leave us? Contradictory answers have 
been provided across three dimensions of parliamentary interaction: first, public 
attitudes, second, state governance and, third, the practice of representation. 
The first dimension points on the one hand towards a Ôcrisis of public confidenceÕ in 
terms of specific indictors of public support and trust in the UK parliament. Yet, at the 
same time, generalised support for parliament within a broader context of 
representative democracy indicates continuing high levels of general or diffuse 
support in an Eastonian sense. 
The second dimension identifies contemporary modes of governance at variance 
with the prescriptions of Ôrepresentative and responsibleÕ government focused upon a 
sovereign parliament at Westminster. Yet, all contemporary governments have 
consistently defended UK state institutional interactions in terms of the 
Ôrepresentative and responsibleÕ core of the Westminster model. Executives have 
thus defended a model of legitimation, the practical deficiencies of which challenge 
the very claims to legitimacy incorporated within the model. In so doing they have 
been locked into a mindset incapable of conceiving of an alternative governing 
model without dissipating the Ôlegislative-centric theory of parliamentary sovereigntyÕ. 
If a ÔheadshiftÕ (see below) is required to break out of this logical loop of crisis it 
would be confronted with the fundamental paradox that such a reconceptualisation 
would presumably entail devising a different model to one based upon traditional 
principles of electoral representation and responsibility. In other words, it would be a 
post-parliamentary system. Yet, even those models that profess to be Ôpost-
parliamentaryÕ (as noted above and below; see also Chapter 2) recognise that such 
an alternative is premised upon a ÔdependenceÕ on parliamentary institutional forms. 
The third dimension distils the essence of this conceptual crisis. As noted above, 
non-electoral claims are made with increasing intensity. Non-electoral modes of 
representation are both advocated and deployed with increasing vigour. Yet electoral 
representation is still distinctive. The problem is that in seeking to make this form of 
representation less distinctive, a challenge is posited at a conceptual level and 
promoted at a behavioural level through notions and modes of non-electoral 
representation. Thus to claim that non-electoral representation supplements and 
enhances electoral representation somehow misses the point that in the process of 
supplementation the latter would become less distinct. To paraphrase DubnikÕs 
(2011: 712) statement on accountability, ÔAny effort to enhance representation also 
alters representationÕ. 
Indeed, those theorists, such as Keane (2009a: 697), who call for Ôa headshiftÕ and Ôa 
break with conventional thinkingÕ do so out of a belief that a more empirically realistic 
model of Ôactually existing democracyÕ (Keane 2011: 212) is required to acknowledge 
the ÔmorphingÕ of representative democracy into Ôa new historical form of Òpost-
parliamentaryÓ democracyÕ (Keane 2011: 212). In common with other analyses of 
non-electoral representation examined earlier in this chapter, KeaneÕs own model of 
Ômonitory democracyÕ is based on the premise that existing descriptions of 
representative democracy are Ôjust too simpleÕ (2011: 231). While this is not the 
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place to examine the intricacies and convolutions of this model, all that needs to be 
noted here is that Ômonitory democracyÕ encapsulates a vast array of extra-
parliamentary, often non-elected, scrutinising institutions Ð both formal and informal. 
In this model, political legitimacy is nested in multiple demoi, reflecting a vast 
diversity of interest; with decision-makers Ôsubject constantly to the ideal of public 
chastening, tied down by a thousand Lilliputian strings of scrutinyÕ (Keane 2009b). 
Keane is adamant that monitory democracy Ôoperates in ways greatly at variance 
with textbook accounts of ÒrepresentativeÓ, ÒliberalÓ or Òparliamentary democracyÓÕ 
(Keane 2009a: 706, 2011: 221). Yet, in calling for Ôa headshiftÕ and a 
reconceptualisation of representative democracy, he insists, repeatedly, that 
Ôlegislatures neither disappear, nor necessarily decline in importanceÕ (2011: 213), 
that Ômonitory democracies depend upon legislaturesÕ (2011: 218) and that monitory 
democracy Ôthrives on representationÕ (2009a: 699). However, if monitory democracy 
is to be conceived as Ôsomething other and differentÕ (2011: 231), it necessarily 
poses a challenge Ôto the legitimacy of institutional structures that were previously 
widely valuedÕ (Boin 2004: 168). In this sense, linking back to ÕtHart and BoinÕs claim 
that legitimacy is the currency of crisis, this challenge gives rise to a conceptual 
crisis: insofar as the disjunction confronting governance analyses (noted above) is 
also manifest in the contradictions embedded in a ÔheadshiftÕ required to make sense 
of non-electoral and monitory modes of representation in a political system still 
legitimised by electoral representation and parliamentary institutions. In which case, 
conceptualising Ôsomething other and differentÕ (a new democratic institutional 
topography) is ultimately dependent on retaining Ôsomething the same and similarÕ 
(namely parliamentary institutions and processes of electoral representation). The 
historic legitimation expectations associated with the latter and the changed 
legitimation claims of the former hold the potential, to paraphrase Boin (2004: 168), 
to be unremittingly discrepant. Therein lie the roots of a conceptual crisis. 
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